For years, the security advice was simple: turn on multi-factor authentication (MFA) and you'll stop most account takeovers. That advice worked so well that attackers had to adapt, and they have. Today, many business email compromises start at accounts that did have MFA turned on.
The problem isn't MFA itself. It's that the most common kinds (text-message codes, authenticator codes and "Approve / Deny" push notifications) all depend on a person recognizing a trick in the moment. And attackers have become very good at tricks.
Don't turn MFA off. Any MFA is still far better than a password alone, and it stops a huge share of automated attacks. The goal of this article is to help you move from basic MFA to strong MFA, and to add the layers that catch what MFA misses.
How attackers get around MFA
These are the techniques we see most often aimed at small and mid-sized businesses. None of them require breaking any encryption. They all work by fooling a person or stealing something after the login has already happened.
01MFA fatigue (push bombing)
The attacker already has the password, often from an old breach or a phishing email. They try to sign in over and over, sending wave after wave of "Approve sign-in?" prompts to the victim's phone, sometimes late at night. Eventually, a tired or confused person taps Approve just to make it stop. Some attackers follow up with a call or message pretending to be IT: "We're fixing an issue, please approve the prompt."
02Adversary-in-the-middle phishing
This is the big one. The victim gets a convincing email ("You have a shared document", "Your password expires today") that leads to a fake Microsoft 365 or Google sign-in page. Behind the scenes, the fake page passes everything to the real sign-in page in real time: the password, then the MFA code or push approval.
The login succeeds, and the attacker captures the session cookie, the digital token that says "this person already signed in." With that token, they can open the mailbox from their own computer without needing the password or MFA again. Ready-made kits for this attack are sold cheaply online, so it no longer takes skill.
03Session token theft by malware
"Infostealer" malware, often hidden in fake software downloads, browser extensions or cracked apps, quietly copies saved passwords and session cookies from a computer's web browser. The attacker then imports those cookies and is already signed in. No password, no MFA prompt.
04SIM swapping and help desk tricks
If MFA codes go by text message, an attacker can talk a mobile carrier into moving the victim's phone number to a new SIM card, and receive the codes themselves. A similar trick targets your own IT help desk: the attacker calls pretending to be an employee who "got a new phone" and asks for MFA to be reset.
05Gaps where MFA isn't enforced
Sometimes attackers don't need to bypass MFA at all, because it isn't required everywhere. Common gaps include older email protocols ("legacy authentication") that can't do MFA, service accounts that were excluded "temporarily", and third-party apps that a user granted access to their mailbox through a consent prompt.
Not all MFA is equal
Here's how common MFA methods compare against the attacks above:
| Method | Stops password-only attacks | Resists push fatigue | Resists phishing sites |
|---|---|---|---|
| Text message or voice call codes | Yes | Yes | No (also exposed to SIM swaps) |
| Simple "Approve / Deny" push | Yes | No | No |
| Authenticator app codes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Push with number matching | Yes | Mostly | No |
| Passkeys / FIDO2 security keys | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Windows Hello for Business | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Certificate-based sign-in | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Notice that every method that isn't in bold can be relayed through a fake sign-in page. The person types the code or approves the push, and the attacker's site passes it along.
What "phishing-resistant" actually means
Phishing-resistant methods like passkeys and FIDO2 security keys work differently. When you register a passkey, it's cryptographically tied to the real website's address (for example, login.microsoftonline.com). When you later try to sign in, your device checks the address itself.
If you land on a look-alike phishing site, the passkey simply won't work there, no matter how convincing the page looks. There's no code to type and nothing to approve, so there's nothing for the person to be tricked into handing over. The protection doesn't depend on someone spotting the fake.
Passkeys are easier, too. For most people, signing in with a passkey means a fingerprint, face scan or device PIN. It's typically faster than typing a password and waiting for a code, which helps with adoption.
Seven layers to add around MFA
Stronger MFA is the foundation, but session tokens can still be stolen after sign-in. These layers close the remaining gaps. Most are available in Microsoft 365 Business Premium or Microsoft Entra ID P1 and above.
01Use phishing-resistant MFA, starting with the highest-risk people
Require passkeys, FIDO2 keys or Windows Hello for Business for administrators first, then for finance, executives and anyone who can move money or access sensitive data.
02Turn on number matching and sign-in context everywhere else
For people still using push notifications, make sure they have to type a number shown on the sign-in screen and can see the app and location requesting access. Microsoft Authenticator now enforces number matching by default, but check that older settings haven't overridden it.
03Require trusted, managed devices with Conditional Access
Conditional Access policies can allow access to company data only from devices your business manages and keeps secure. Even if an attacker steals a password and gets past MFA, a sign-in from their own laptop gets blocked.
04Shorten and protect sessions
Limit how long sign-in sessions stay valid on unmanaged devices, and turn on features that revoke sessions quickly when risk changes, such as Continuous Access Evaluation in Microsoft 365. Where available, token protection ties a session to the device it was issued on, so a stolen cookie is useless elsewhere.
05Block legacy authentication and restrict app consent
Turn off older sign-in protocols that can't do MFA. Then require administrator approval before users can grant third-party apps access to their mailbox or files.
06Lock down MFA registration and resets
Attackers who get in will often register their own MFA method to keep access. Require that new MFA methods be registered only from trusted locations or devices, alert on new registrations, and give your help desk a strict identity check before resetting anyone's MFA, such as a video call or a callback to a number on file.
07Watch for the signs, and stop infostealers on devices
Alert on risky sign-ins (impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, anonymous proxies) and on suspicious mailbox rules, like new rules that forward or hide email. A favorite attacker trick is a rule that moves replies into an obscure folder. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) on every computer helps catch infostealer malware before it can harvest sessions.
Where to start
If you're starting from basic MFA today, here's a sensible order:
- This week: Make sure MFA is enforced for every account with no exceptions, block legacy authentication, and confirm number matching is on.
- This month: Issue passkeys or security keys to all administrators, and set up alerts for risky sign-ins, new MFA registrations and suspicious mailbox rules.
- This quarter: Roll out Conditional Access requiring managed devices, extend phishing-resistant MFA to finance and leadership, and tighten your help desk reset process.
- Next: Move the rest of the organization to passkeys, and retire text-message codes wherever possible.
The bottom line
MFA is still one of the most valuable security controls you can have. But "we have MFA" is no longer the finish line. The attacks that work today go after the person approving the prompt and the session after sign-in. Phishing-resistant authentication, trusted devices and good monitoring together close those gaps.
Not sure how strong your sign-in security really is? We can review your Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace setup and show you exactly where the gaps are, with no obligation.